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MWH D-1/4a

March 17, 1959

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MACMILLAN TALES
Washington, March 19-23, 1959

Bowlin Contingency Planning
(Position Paper)

An earlier version of this paper, circulated as D-1/4, was drafted by GER - Mr. McKiernan and cleared by EUR - Mr. Kohler; GER - Mr. Vigdorman; BNA - Mr. Swihart; EE - Mr. McSweeney and GFA - Mr. Lampson. The attached paper replaces D-1/4, which should be destroyed.

This paper reflects the refinements made in D-1/4 at an inter-bureau meeting in the Acting Secretary's office on March 16.

It is circulated for your information.

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Agency Case # 87-219
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By [signature] NLE Date 6/27/98

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MACMILLAN TALKS
Washington, March 19-23, 1959

Berlin Contingency Planning

Anticipated British Position

Macmillan may raise the following points regarding plans for dealing with possible withdrawal of Soviet personnel from the Autobahn checkpoints:

1. The British think we might allow time-stamping of some sort of paper by the East Germans (GDR).
2. The British think the Three Powers might suggest to the Soviets that the transfer of their functions to the GDR would be acceptable if the USSR designated the GDR as its "agent" and both the USSR and GDR guaranteed Allied access to Berlin.
3. The British favor a "garrison airlift" if surface traffic is interrupted.



Recommended United States Position

1. The Western Allies have already agreed that unilateral Soviet repudiation of its obligations concerning Western presence in Berlin and freedom of access to Berlin cannot be accepted, and substitution of East German authorities for the Soviets is equally unacceptable.

2. We will not tolerate GDR attempts to control or interfere with our traffic to Berlin via quadripartitely established routes and will take necessary measures to protect our rights. We are not prepared to relinquish rights acquired by victory.

3. With respect to the three points above which the British may raise:

(1)(a) Unless an agency relationship exists, we are agreed that we will not accept the substitution of the GDR for the Soviets in performing the functions which the Soviets have heretofore exercised regarding our access.

(b) However,

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(b) However, we are prepared to take the necessary steps, in the event of a Soviet withdrawal from these functions, to identify Allied movements as such.

(c) The British believe that the identification procedures might include the stamping of documents. While permitting the stamping of documents might not have the legal effect of accepting the substitution of the GDR for the USSR, we consider that adequate identification procedures can be worked out without stamping and that permitting such stamping could suggest a GDR right to control the movement of allied traffic to Berlin.

(2) If in fact the USSR and GDR would acknowledge that the GDR, in performing the functions of the USSR, was acting as the agent of the USSR, we could agree to the performance by the GDR of the functions which the Soviets have heretofore exercised regarding our access to Berlin. Soviet-GDR acknowledgment of such an agency relationship, however, seems highly unlikely.

(3) We have not rejected a "garrison airlift" and have done some planning for one. However, we hesitate to talk about an airlift of any sort because it would become public knowledge and imply we do not intend to make a firm stand on surface access. Such a development would be to our disadvantage in dealing with the Soviets.



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